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PLAYING HARDBALL IN FEDERAL COURT:
JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO REFEREE
UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT
BRADLEY W. FOSTER
Do you comb through case law looking for technical ex-
cuses not to respond to those interrogatories? Do you re-
fuse to stipulate to anything? Fight to the death over
every issue? Refuse to back down in the face of over-
whelming odds? Is this the lawyer you are? Or aspire to
be? Or fear to come up against? This, my friend, is
hardball.'
I. THE PROBLEM
INCREASINGLY, LAWYERS ARE approaching trial ad-
vocacy with a Rambo-like attitude, a belief that litigation
is a war which must be won at all costs. 2 This approach
has been colorfully dubbed as "hardball" lawyering.3 The
term has often been used to describe a course of conduct
in which an attorney "is personally antagonistic or insis-
tent on all of the procedural rules being followed."' One
commentator has stated that hardball tactics are fre-
quently characterized by the following: a mindset that liti-
I Bodine, In This Issue, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987, at 10.
2 See Sayler, Rambo Litigation, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 78.
• See Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987, at 48. " 'Hardball is
playing with a baseball, not a softball; it's faster and harder hitting and implies a
high level of professionalism and the major leagues.'. But . . .it doesn't mean
spitball or sleazeball. 'It's a game where winning within the bounds of the rules is
the most important thing.' " Id. at 49 (quoting Monroe Freedman, a legal ethics
professor at Hofstra University).
Id. at 48.
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gation is warfare and a concurrent tendency to describe
trial advocacy in military terms, a belief that common
courtesy and civility ill-befit the true warrior, a willingness
to manipulate facts and fire off unnecessary motions and
discovery requests in order to intimidate the opposing
party, and an overriding urge to put the attorney on
center stage, rather than the client or his cause. 5 While
the term "hardball" probably defies a comprehensive def-
inition, most lawyers will agree that, like Justice Stewart
with pornography, you know it when you see it.6
Most attorneys play hardball occasionally, generally as a
last resort, but an alarming number do so routinely, rel-
ishing their macho image and the adrenal rush of court-
room battle. Champions of this form of advocacy argue
that hardball tactics are essential for attorneys in fulfilling
their duty to act as zealous advocates for their clients.8
Opponents counter that hardball tactics needlessly waste
both time and resources, delaying the administration ofjustice and threatening to place litigation beyond the fi-
nancial reach of most litigants.9
Sayler, supra note 2, at 78.
See id. Because of the inherent nature of the adversary system, most hardball
is played in the field of litigation. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 49. One lawyer
has stated, "When I go into the courtroom, I come in to do battle ... I'm not
there to do a minuet." Id.
7 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 48.
9 See id. at 50-51. "The greatest crime... is not when the attorney is overzeal-
ous but when he isn't zealous enough." Id. at 50; cf AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS' CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT Preamble (1987), which provides in part:
To his client, a lawyer owes undivided allegiance, the utmost appli-
cation of his learning, skill and industry, and the employment of all
appropriate legal means within the law to protect and enforce legiti-
mate interests. In the discharge of this duty, a lawyer should not be
deterred by any real or fancied fear of judicial disfavor, or public
unpopularity.
Id But see AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS' CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT Rule
13(b)(1987) ("A lawyer should avoid disparaging personal remarks or acrimony
toward opposing counsel, and should remain wholly uninfluenced by any ill feel-
ing between the respective clients."). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILrY EC 7-10 (1980)("The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with
zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration
all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless
harm.").
1 Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286
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Among the primary opponents of hardball litigation are
judges. Perceiving a sharp decline in lawyer professional-
ism,'0 judges are beginning to speak out vigorously,,
against hardball tactics."I Former Chief Justice Burger 
re-
cently urged that a small handful of lawyers must not be
allowed to abuse the court system and preempt its time
and machinery for purposes not intended, thereby deny-
ing access to the federal courts to others in need of its
limited resources.' 2 But judges are by-no means alone.
One lawyer lamented:
What has happened to the "gentleman" trial lawyer of the
past, like Atticus Finch in Harper Lee's To Kill A Mocking-
bird, who walked arm in arm with his opposing attorney
after a long day of a very emotional trial? Today it ap-
pears that trial lawyers don't even speak civilly to each
other. From the time the suit is filed, they often harbor
such animosity toward each other that they speak as little
(N.D. Tex. 1988)(en banc). The court stated, "We address today a problem that,
though of relatively recent origin, is so pernicious that it threatens to delay the
administration ofjustice and to place litigation beyond the financial reach of liti-
gants." Id. For a discussion that insists that hardball litigation is not only detri-
mental to the system, but is also simply bad advocacy, see Sayler, supra note 2. But,
see Committee on Federal Courts, A Proposed Code of Litigation Conduct, 43 THE REC-
ORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 738, 738-39
(1988) ("[Ilt is simply not true that 'hardball' litigation always constitutes bad or
ineffective lawyering. Many clients do crumble in the face of an opposing coun-
sel's campaign of harassment, and those lawyers who set out to make life unremit-
tingly unpleasant for their adversaries often do succeed in wearing those
adversaries down."). The Committee insists that arguments against hardball tac-
tics should not be merely utilitarian; such arguments are easily countered by ex-
amples of situations in which hardball tactics clearly worked. Id. at 739.
," A 1985 poll of state and federal judges indicated that 55% felt that lawyer
professionalism was on the decline. Report of Commission on Professionalism,
112 F.R.D. 243, 254 (1986). Judges are by no means the only ones who question
the professionalism of lawyers. Id. The same study revealed that only six percent
of corporate users of legal services felt that "all or most" lawyers deserved to be
called professionals, and 68% of these corporate clients stated that lawyer profes-
sionalism was decreasing over time. Id.
- See supra note 9 for an example of judicial attacks against hardball tactics;
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 565 (3d Cir. 1985)("The dramatic
rise in litigation in the last decade has led trial judges to conclude that indulgent
toleration of lawyers' misconduct is simply a luxury the federal court system no
longer can afford."); see also Sayler, supra note 2, at 81.
-2 Burger, Abuses of Discovery, TRIAL, Sept. 1984, at 18, 19.
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as possible thereafter - even after the case is over.'
3
Exasperated by the damage to the legal system caused
by hardball practices, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas sat en banc to adopt stan-
dards designed to end such practices in Dondi Properties
Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Association.'4  Using
Dondi Properties as an example, this comment will examine
judicial attempts to establish standards of litigation con-
duct for attorneys. In doing so, it will specifically address
the following: (1) the litigation standards imposed by the
Dondi Properties court; 15 (2) the power of federal courts to
enforce such standards; 6 (3) possible due process road-
, Albright, Waging Unconditional Warfare, TEX. LAw., Sept. 5, 1988, at 18.
,4 121 F.R.D. at 284. This opinion arose from a consolidation of two cases filed
in the Northern District of Texas, Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. &
Loan Ass'n and Knight v. Protective Life Ins. Co. [Hereinafter the individual
cases will be referred to as Dondi and Knight respectively. The consolidated opin-
ion will be referred to as Dondi Properties].
In discussing possible reasons for the rise in abusive conduct by attorneys, the
court stated:
As judges and former practitioners from varied backgrounds and
levels of experience, we judicially know that litigation is conducted
today in a manner far different from years past. Whether the in-
creased size of the bar has decreased collegiality, or the legal profes-
sion has become only a business, or experienced lawyers have
ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be observed, or be-
cause of other factors not readily categorized, we observe patterns of
behavior that forebode ill for our system ofjustice.
Id. at 286.
- See infra notes 19-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Dondi
Properties standards.
"1 See infra notes 41-121 and accompanying text for a discussion of the power of
federal courts to enforce the Dondi Properties standards. An analysis of the power
of each state jurisdiction to sanction attorneys for abusive litigation practices is
beyond the scope of this comment. For a general discussion of state court sanc-
tioning powers, see Annotation, Attorney's Liability Under State Law for Opposing
Party's Counsel Fees, 56 A.L.R. 4TH 486 (1987); Annotation, Award of Damages for
Dilatory Tactics in Prosecuting Appeal in State Court, 91 A.L.R. 3D 661 (1979). In the
federal context, this comment does not attempt a comprehensive examination of
the sanctioning powers of federal courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. A number of commentators have more than adequately examined the sanc-
tioning power of federal courts in the aftermath of the 1983 amendments to Rule
11 and the discovery rules. See, e.g., Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D.
189 (1988); Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181 (1985); SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SANC-
TIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS (2d ed. 1988); Shaffer, Rule 11: Bright Light,
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blocks to such enforcement;' 7 and (4) advantages and
drawbacks to such enforcement.' 8
II. ATTEMPTING TO CURB THE PROBLEM -
DONDI PROPERTIES
In Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation,'9 the district court sat en banc to adopt standards
of litigation conduct for attorneys appearing in civil ac-
tions before the court. 20 Dondi Properties was a consolida-
tion of two cases filed in the Northern District of Texas,
Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Associa-
tion 21 and Knight v. Protective Life Insurance Co. 22
In Dondi, sanction motions and motions to compel were
filed against the plaintiff for failing to answer interrogato-
ries and comply with discovery orders, for improperly
withholding documents, and for misrepresenting facts to
the court.2 3 The defendants asserted that the plaintiff's
failure to comply with the prior orders of the magistrate
constituted "bad faith" and warranted dismissal of the ac-
Dim Future, 7 REV. OF LITIGATION 1 (1987); Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Toward Judicial
Restraint, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 337 (1987); Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse --
The Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Views from the Bench and
Bar, 57 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 671 (1983); Comment, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26
- Scalpel or Meat-ax? The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 183 (1985). Furthermore, these rules probably are not even appli-
cable in a wide variety of situations involving hardball conduct. See infra notes 49-
79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 11 and its applicability to hard-
ball conduct.
.7 See infra notes 122-145 and accompanying text for a discussion of due process
constraints on the power of courts to enforce the Dondi Properties standards.
i" See infra notes 146-179 and accompanying text for a discussion of the advan-
tages and drawbacks of vigorous enforcement of the Dondi Properties standards.
it, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988)(en banc).
2-" Id. at 285.
2, Dondi was an action for recovery based upon civil RICO, common law fraud,
federal regulations prohibiting affiliate transactions, civil conspiracy, negligent
misrepresentation, and usury, arising in connection with activities relating to a
failed savings and loan association. Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 285.
22 Knight was an action for recovery based upon alleged violations of the Texas
Insurance Code and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection
Act, breach of contract, and breach of duty of good faith, all arising from the
refusal of the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the proceeds of a life insurance
policy. Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 285.
2.4 Id.
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tion or the award of other relief to the defendants. 24 The
defendants also moved for sanctions against the plaintiff's
-attorney for failing to identify himself and his client in a
discussion with a prospective witness.2 5
In Knight, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike a reply
brief filed by the defendant without leave of the court.
2 6
The plaintiff asserted that the reply should be stricken be-
cause the defendant failed to obtain leave to file the reply,
a violation of a local rule, 7 and because the defendant
filed his reply more than twenty days after the plaintiff's
response was filed. 8 In the alternative, the plaintiff
sought permission to file an additional response.29
The en banc court set the tone for its admonitory opin-
ion by suggesting that hardball litigation tactics, while of
relatively recent origin, have become so pernicious that
they threaten to impede the effective administration of
justice and place litigation beyond the financial reach of
most litigants °.3  The court stated:
With alarming frequency, we find that valuable judicial
and attorney time is consumed in resolving the unneces-
sary contention and sharp practices between lawyers.
Judges and magistrates of this court are required to
devote substantial attention to refereeing abusive litiga-
tion tactics that range from benign incivility to outright
I2 d. Noting the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, the
court stated:
Such characterization of a party opponent's conduct should be spar-
ingly employed by counsel and should be reserved for only those
instances in which there is sound basis in fact demonstrating a
party's deliberate and intentional disregard of an order of the court
or of obligations imposed under applicable Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Such allegations, when inappropriately made, add much
heat but little light to the court's task of deciding discovery disputes.
Id. at 289.
"2. Id. at 290.
26 Id. at 285.
21 The rule provides, "In the discretion of the PresidingJudge, the movant may
be permitted to file a reply brief if permission is sought immediately upon the
receipt of the response to the motion." N.D. TEX. R. 5.1(0.




obstruction. Our system of justice can ill-afford to devote
scarce resources to supervising matters that do not ad-
vance the resolution of the merits of a case; nor can justice
long remain available to deserving litigants if the costs of
litigation are fueled unnecessarily to the point of being,,
prohibitive.3
The court thus determined that it should adopt stan-
dards of litigation conduct without awaiting action by the
circuit court. 32 It concluded that district courts are in the
best position to evaluate what are acceptable trial-level
practices by litigating attorneys .3 Accordingly, the court
adopted the following standards of practice to be ob-
served by attorneys appearing in civil actions in the
Northern District of Texas:
(A) In fulfilling his or her primary duty to the client, a law-
yer must be ever conscious of the broader duty to the judi-
cial system that serves both attorney and client.
(B) A lawyer owes, to the judiciary, candor, diligence and
utmost respect.
(C) A lawyer owes, to opposing counsel, a duty of cour-
tesy and cooperation, the observance of which is necessary,
for the efficient administration of our system ofjustice and
the respect of the public it serves.
(D) A lawyer unquestionably owes, to the administration
of justice, the fundamental duties of personal dignity and
professional integrity.
(E) Lawyers should treat each other, the opposing party,
the court, and members of the court staff with courtesy
and civility and conduct themselves in a professional man-
ner at all times.
(F) A client has no right to demand that counsel abuse the
opposite party or indulge in offensive conduct. A lawyer
I' Id.
'2 Id. at 287.
.1-1 Id. The court analogized to Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866,
873 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Fifth Circuit concluded that in Rule 11 cases, "the
district court will have a better grasp of what is acceptable trial-level practice
among litigating members of the bar than will appellate judges"); see Dondi Proper-
ties, 121 F.R.D. at 287.
19891
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shall always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fair-
ness and due consideration.
(G) In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and
though ill feeling may exist between clients, such ill feel-
,ing should not influence a lawyer's conduct, attitude, or
demeanor towards opposing lawyers.
(H) A lawyer should not use any form of discovery, or the
scheduling of discovery, as a means of harassing opposing
counsel or counsel's client.
(I) Lawyers will be, punctual in communications with
others and in honoring scheduled appearances, and will
recognize that neglect and tardiness are demeaning to the
lawyer and to the judicial system.
(J) If a fellow member of the Bar makes a just request for
cooperation, or seeks scheduling accommodation, a law-
yer will not arbitrarily or unreasonably withhold consent.
(K) Effective advocacy does not require antagonistic or
obnoxious behavior and members of the Bar will adhere
to the higher standard of conduct which judges, lawyers,
clients, and the public may rightfully expect . 4
.4 Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 287-88. The court borrowed these standards
from the DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY and
THE DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION LAWYER'S CREED. Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at
287. The court noted that the new standards are consistent with the American
Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. at 288 n.9. EC
7-36 of the Model Code provides:
Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and or-
derly procedures designed to protect the rights of all parties.
Although a lawyer has the duty to represent his client zealously, he
should not engage in any conduct that offends the dignity and deco-
rum of proceedings. While maintaining his independence, a lawyer
should be respectful, courteous, and above-board in his relations
with a judge or hearing officer before whom he appears. He should
avoid undue solicitude for the comfort or convenience of judge or
jury and should avoid any other conduct calculated to gain special
consideration.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-36 (1980). EC 7-37
provides:
In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling
may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a law-
yer in his conduct, attitude, and demeanor towards opposing law-
yers. A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory personal
reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by
lawyers interfere with the orderly administration ofjustice and have
no proper place in our legal system.
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The court further indicated that it will simply no longer
tolerate abusive hardball practices. 5 It stated that liti-
gants who persistently played hardball could expect their
conduct to prompt an appropriate response from the
court. 3 6 The court stated that its response to improper lit-
igation tactics might include "a warm friendly discussion
on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court,
compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or other
measures appropriate to the circumstances. ' 37 The Dondi
Properties court apparently suggests that if pushed too far,
it too can play hardball.
One commentator has suggested that the Dondi Proper-
ties opinion came as a "breath of fresh air" to the majority
of trial lawyers who are concerned about the tension and
delay caused by hardball lawyers.3 8 It remains to be seen,
however, whether these standards will accomplish their
objective. The standards will be difficult to enforce be-
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-37 (1980). EC 7-38
provides:
A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should ac-
cede to reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, settings,
continuances, waiver of procedural formalities, and similar matters
which do not prejudice the rights of his client. He should follow lo-
cal customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to
opposing counsel of his intention not to do so. A lawyer should be
punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38 (1980); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1980), supra note 8.
' Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 288. The court stated:
We think the standards we now adopt are ... appropriately estab-
lished to signal our strong disapproval of practices that have no
place in our system ofjustice and to emphasize that a lawyer's con-
duct, both with respect to the court and to other lawyers, should at
all times be characterized by honesty and fair play.
Id. at 288-89.
' Id. at 288. The court stated, "Those litigators who persist in viewing them-
selves solely as combatants, or who perceive that they are retained to win at all
costs without regard to fundamental principles of justice ... can expect instead
that their conduct will prompt an appropriate response from the court ..... Id.
47 Id. (quoting Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878). The Dondi Properties court stated that
appropriate sanctions include the full range of sanctions available in the Rule 11
context, but noted that it was not intending to adopt Rule 11 jurisprudence in the
context of the case at bar. Id. at 288 & n.10.
-is Albright, supra note 13, at 19.
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cause they are both quite broad and rather nebulous.
Words like "courtesy", "cooperation", and "civility" are
not easily defined. 9 On the other hand, perhaps the mere
articulation of the standards, rather than their enforce-
ment, may serve to signal the litigating bar that it is still
appropriate for lawyers to behave like "gentlemen.""40
Even if this is the case, the impact of Dondi Properties will
be far more significant if the standards of conduct can be
effectively and efficiently enforced.
III. ENFORCING THE DONDI PROPERTIES
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
The questions necessarily arise whether federal courts
have the power to enforce standards of practice such as
those promulgated in Dondi Properties,4 ' and whether an
opinion such as Dondi Properties adds anything to the ex-
isting powers of federal courts to sanction hardball con-
duct. Enforcement powers could conceivably emanate
from a number of different sources, including the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which gives
district courts the power to tax costs and attorneys' fees
against attorneys who unreasonably and vexatiously mul-
tiply the proceedings in a case, 43 and the vague "inherent
powers ' 44 of the courts. Each of these sources will be ex-
49 Id.
40Id.
4 The Dondi Properties court did not indicate whether it was promulgating these
standards under the authority of any particular rule or statute. Instead, prior to
listing the new standards of conduct, the court simply cited a laundry list of rules
and statutes which give district courts the power to control trial practices. Dondi
Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 287.
42 See infra notes 49-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11.
4. See infra notes 80-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 1927.
Section 1927 provides, "Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably or vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy per-
sonally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred be-
cause of such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
44 See infra notes 98-121 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inherent
power of federal courts; cf Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (a court may assess attorneys' fees when the losing party
has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons); Thomas,
amined in turn.
In analyzing the power of federal courts to enforce the
Dondi Properties standards, the following hypothetical,
loosely borrowed from Knight v. Protective Life Insurance
Co.,45 will be utilized: Defendant files a motion to join an
additional party. Plaintiff files a response to this motion.
Without obtaining leave of the court as required by a local
rule, defendant files a reply brief to plaintiff's response.
Thereafter, in an attempt to harass and intimidate the
other side, the plaintiff files a motion to strike the reply
brief because the rule was violated, despite the fact that
the reply does little to harm the plaintiff's case. The
plaintiff clearly is being "personally antagonistic or insis-
tent on all of the procedural rules being followed. ' '46 In
short, he is playing hardball. By failing to cooperate with
opposing counsel, he also has violated the standards
promulgated in Dondi Properties.47 But can he be sanc-
tioned for such conduct? Do federal courts currently have
the power to enforce these guidelines, especially with re-
spect to intangibles like a cooperative attitude?4" This
section will explore the possible answers to these
questions.
836 F.2d at 875 (district court has inherent power to award attorneys' fees when
losing party has acted in bad faith during the course of the litigation).
- See Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 285-86.
' See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying discussion for a definition of hardball
conduct.
7 See Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 287-88.
4 In Knight, the court never reached this question. The court stated that the
attorneys violated the standards promulgated by the en banc court by failing to
cooperate with one another. Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 291. The court noted
that the attorneys' lack of cooperation was a waste of both time and judicial re-
sources. Id. Nevertheless, the court not only failed to discuss the possible imposi-
tion of sanctions, it did not even warn the attorneys to change their conduct. It
simply held that the defendant's reply brief should not be stricken and that the
plaintiff could not file a further response. Id. at 292. Note that Knight was not
decided by the en banc court which promulgated the standards of litigation con-
duct, but only by the judge before whom the case was originally brought. Id. at
286 n.4.
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A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Any discussion of sanctions almost invariably begins
with Rule 11,1 9 and not without good reason.5" Since its
amendment in 1983, Rule 11 has been both highly touted
and vigorously applied. 51 Nevertheless, it is generally an
inappropriate means for sanctioning hardball conduct, at
least the type of conduct evident in our hypothetical. One
court noted, "Rule 11 is not a panacea intended to rem-
edy all manner of attorney misconduct. '52 The Dondi
Properties court apparently agreed. That court specifically
stated that it was not adopting Rule 11 jurisprudence in
the context of the standards of litigation which it promu-
lated.53 This part will examine the potential applicability
of Rule 11 to hardball conduct in general, and our hypo-
thetical situation in particular.54
Rule 11 requires every pleading, motion, and other pa-
per of a party represented by an attorney to be signed by
the attorney.55 This signature constitutes a certification
by the attorney that (1) "to the best of his knowledge, in-
formation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law,"'5 6 and (2) "that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.' 5 7
On its face, Rule 11 seems to apply to our hypothetical
situation because the plaintiff's motion to strike was inter-
-, See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
so See Joseph, Rule 11 Is Only the Beginning, A.B.A.J., May 1, 1988, at 62.
" Id. For a general discussion of Rule 11 sanctions, see Vairo, Rule 11: A Criti-
cal Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988); Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule
11 -A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985); SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS (2d ed. 1988).
52 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1986).
.1 Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 288 n.10.
. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hypothet-
ical situation.




posed for an improper purpose. Nevertheless, judicial in-
terpretation of this rule has generally limited sanctions to
situations in which the signed paper is not well-grounded
in fact and law.58 In most circuits, if a motion has objec-
tive merit,59 it will not be sanctioned even if filed in bad
faith.60  An example of the unwillingness of courts to
- See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir.
1986)(court reversed an award of sanctions under Rule 11 against an attorney
who failed to cite contrary authority in a brief to the court). The Golden Eagle court
held, "A complaint which complies with the 'well-grounded in fact and warranted
by ... law' clause cannot be sanctioned as harassment under Rule 11, regardless
of the subjective intent of the attorney or litigant." Id. at 1538. The court further
stated:
Rule 11 is intended to reduce the burden on district courts by sanc-
tioning, and hence deterring, attorneys who submit motions or
pleadings which cannot reasonably be supported in law or in fact.
We therefore reverse the district court's imposition of sanctions for
conduct which it felt fell short of the ethical responsibilities of the
attorney.
Id. at 1542; see also National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1988) ("if an initial complaint passes the
test of non-frivolousness, its filing does not constitute harassment for the purpose
of Rule 11"); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir.
1981) ("Because of the objective standard applicable to Rule 11, a complaint that
is well-grounded in fact and law cannot be sanctioned regardless of counsel's sub-
jective intent.").
'5 See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988)(en
banc) (objective standard used to examine attorney's conduct under Rule 11); see
also Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (1 th Cir. 1987)(en banc); Stevens
v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v.
Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 205 (9th Cir. 1985).
- See City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 649 F. Supp. 716, 736 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd, 844 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Even a bad faith motion does not justify
Rule 11 sanctions where ... the court has concluded that the arguments advanced
are not lacking in colorable legal support."); see also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803
F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) ("Although
Eastway might be read as leaving open the possibility of imposing rule 11 sanc-
tions where the attorney is guilty of a violation of the rule, we hold today that
there is no necessary subjective component to a proper rule 11 analy-
sis.")(referring to Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F2d 243 (2d
Cir. 1985)); Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832 (after questioning whether an attorney may
be sanctioned for doing what the law allows, if the attorney's motive for doing so
is improper, the court held that, at least with respect to the filing of the original
complaint, a lawyer may not be sanctioned if the claim has objective merit);
Schwarzer, supra note 51, at 195 ("If a reasonably clear legal justification can be
shown for the filing of the paper in question, no improper purpose can be found
and sanctions are inappropriate."). Note, however, that not all courts are willing
to rule out completely the possibility of imposing sanctions on attorneys who im-
properly file papers that are well grounded in fact and law. See, e.g., National Ass'
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sanction bad faith motions which are well-grounded in
fact and law is found in National Association of Government
Employees, Inc. v. National Federation of Federal Employees.
6t
In National Association, an incumbent labor union
(N.A.G.E.) filed a defamation suit against a challenger
union (N.F.F.E.) during the course of an election to deter-
mine which union would represent the civilian employees
at Fort Hood, Texas. 62 N.A.G.E. filed suit after N.F.F.E.
published a pamphlet containing allegedly false state-
ments regarding N.A.G.E.'s poor treatment of its union
members.63 After concluding that N.A.G.E. had brought
suit not because it had a meritorious claim, but rather for
the purpose of harassing N.F.F.E. and to serve as a cam-
paign tactic, the trial court imposed sanctions against
N.A.G.E. under Rule 11.64 The Fifth Circuit vacated the
of Gov't Employees, 844 F.2d at 224; Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832 n.10. The National
Association court stated:
Like the Zaldivar court, we do not hold that the filing of a paper for
an improper purpose is immunized from Rule 11 sanctions simply
because it is well grounded in fact and law. The case can be made,
for example, as Zaldivar noted, that the filing of excessive motions,
even if each is "well grounded," may under some circumstances con-
stitute "harassment" sanctionable under the Rule.
National Ass 'n of Gov't Employees, 844 F.2d at 224; accord Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832
n. 10; see infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possibility
of sanctioning excessive or repetitious motions, even if each is warranted by fact
and law.
- 844 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1988).
62 Id. at 217.
i. Id. at 218.
64 Id. at 219. The trial court had summarized the plaintiff's conduct as follows:
(1) the court suggested a possible settlement agreement at a pretrial conference,
but the parties would not accept it; (2) the evidence showed that the lawsuit had
been brought "for the purpose of harassing the defendant and to serve as a cam-
paign tactic"; (3) in order for the plaintiff to have prevailed, the jury would have
had to conduct "extensive extrapolating and bootstrapping"; (4) at the close of
the plaintiff's case, the trial court told the parties that the case should be settled,
that it was inclined to direct a verdict for the defendants but it was not willing to
do so at that time, and that it was considering imposing sanctions; and (5) at the
close of the evidence, the court had again suggested settlement and warned that it
might take away any verdict rendered for the plaintiff, but the plaintiff still refused
to settle the case. Id. After concluding that N.A.G.E.'s suit "was lacking in its
factual and legal basis" and "was brought for the improper purpose of harassing
defendants," it imposed sanctions on N.A.G.E. under Rule 11. Id.
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portion of the judgment awarding sanctions.65
The appellate court held that the Rule 11 sanctions
were inappropriate because the complaint was not "totally
lacking in merit."' 66 The court held that the filing of a
complaint which is well-grounded in fact and law cannot,
as a matter of law, "harass" the defendant in violation of
the rule, regardless of the plaintiff's subjective intent.67
The court determined that subjective bad faith was not an
element of Rule 11 inquiries. 68 Thus, at least with respect
to the filing of initial complaints, Rule 1 1 will not curb bad
faith conduct which has objective merit. Rule 11 simply
loses its teeth in this context.
The National Association court indicated, however, that
every paper filed for an improper purpose is not immu-
nized from Rule 11 sanctions simply because it is well-
grounded in fact and law.69 The court stated while initial
complaints were so immunized, the bad faith filing of ex-
Id. at 217.
"' Id. at 223.
67 Id. The court stated:
We do not condone litigation instituted for ulterior purposes rather
than to secure judgment on a well-grounded complaint in which the
plaintiff sincerely believes. Yet the Rule 11 injunction against har-
assment does not exact of those who file pleadings an undiluted de-
sire for just deserts. In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles [780 F.2d 823,
832 (9th Cir. 1986)], the Ninth Circuit held that the filing of a com-
plaint that complies with the "well grounded in fact and warranted
by existing law" prong of Rule 11 cannot, as a matter of law, "har-
ass" the defendant as Rule 11 forbids, regardless of the plaintiff's
subjective intent .... [We agree] with Zaldivar that if an initial com-
plaint passes the test of non-frivolousness, its filing does not consti-
tute harassment for the purposes of Rule 11.
National Association, 844 F.2d at 223 (footnotes omitted).
- Id. at 224. "The history of the Rule ... indicates that 'subjective bad faith' is
no longer an element of Rule 11 inquiries. Instead, the court must focus on ob-
jectively ascertainable circumstances that support an inference that a filing
harassed the defendant or caused unnecessary delay." Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. The court stated in dicta:
[W]e do not hold that the filing of a paper for an improper purpose
is immunized from Rule 11 sanctions simply because it is well
grounded in fact and law. The case can be made, for example, . ..
that the filing of excessive motions, even if each is "well grounded,"
may under some circumstances constitute "harassment" sanction-
able under the Rule.
Id. (footnotes omitted); accord Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832 n.10.
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cessive motions, even if well grounded, could constitute
harassment sanctionable under the Rule.7" Other circuits,
however, have expressly rejected the contention that ar-
guments which have colorable legal support may be sanc-
tioned if filed in bad faith.7'
By applying the National Association dicta on excessive
motions to our hypothetical situation, a court could con-
ceivably sanction the plaintiff for filing the motion to
strike in bad faith.72 On the other hand, the plaintiff's
conduct in filing the single bad faith motion does not in-
volve the type of "repetitious or excessive filings" the
court was willing to sanction in National Association.73 In
addition, the National Association court seems to indicate
the plaintiff's improper purpose would still have to be de-
7,, National Ass'n, 844 F.2d at 224; see also Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen
Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 1101 (1988)
(in holding that Rule 11 has both objective and subjective components, the court
stated that "[tihe Rule effectively picks up the torts of abuse of process (filing an
objectively frivolous suit) and malicious prosecution (filing a colorable suit for the
purpose of imposing expense on the defendant rather than for the purpose of
winning)"); Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 208 (E.D. Ky.
1987)("even meritorious litigation positions, if taken for purposes of harassment
or other improper reason can violate Rule 1 I").
", See supra note 60 for a discussion of cases which have held that even bad faith
motions may not be sanctionable if they are warranted by fact and law.
., See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of sanctioning
the filing of well grounded excessive motions.
"' See National Ass'n, 844 F.2d at 224. The National Ass'n court cited three cases
in which sanctions had been imposed on plaintiffs for excessive filings. See Wil-
liam Passalacqua Builders v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 281,
285 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(court awarded sanctions for the filing of two motions, the
second of which raised no issues not already raised in the first); Day v. Amoco
Chem. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120, 1121-22 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 747 F.2d
1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985) (court imposed sanctions
under § 1927 and Rule 11 on a plaintiff who, after his complaint has been judged
frivolous and malicious and had been dismissed with prejudice, filed a motion to
correct an alleged misstatement in the record, a motion to vacate the judgment,
and a motion to disqualify the judge); Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 226, 227 (N.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984) (court imposed
sanctions on a plaintiff who filed six consolidated suits, all frivolous, against vari-
ous defendants and had engaged in "particularly egregious and unjustified litig-
iousness"). Yet, it should be noted that in each of these cases, the sanctioned
motions were frivolous, not merely interposed to harass the defendant. National
Ass'n, 844 F.2d at 224.
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termined under an objective test.74 A court may be un-
willing to find that the plaintiff's well-grounded motion,
which was perhaps uncooperative but not excessive and
repetitious, was objectively filed for an improper purpose.
Accordingly, even in a jurisdiction following the dicta in
National Association, our hypothetical plaintiff arguably will
not be sanctionable under Rule 11.
Keeping in mind our hypothetical, it becomes obvious
that Rule 11 is not being utilized to curb this type of hard-
ball conduct. Rule 11 is limited to situations in which a
claim or motion is not well grounded in fact or law.75
While hardball tactics will occasionally fall into this cate-
gory, they also often involve forcing the other side to rig-
idly adhere to the technicalities of procedural rules.76
Thus, their position often has merit under the rules, even
if it subjectively may be considered unreasonable or vexa-
tious. If courts approach Rule 11 from a purely objective
viewpoint, then it will be virtually impossible to sanction a
litigant who files a motion requiring the other side to com-
ply with the procedural rules.77 Another means is thus
74 See NationalAss'n, 844 F.2d at 224 ("Amended Rule 11 mandates the court to
focus on objective circumstances in determining whether an attorney has con-
ducted 'reasonable inquiry' and a paper is 'well grounded' in fact and law, and
purely subjective elements should not be reintroduced into the determination
concerning 'improper purpose.' ") (footnote omitted); Zaldivar v. City of Los An-
geles, 780 F.2d 823, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1986). The Zaldivar court stated:
We believe the conduct forming the basis of the charge of harass-
ment must do more than in fact bother, annoy or vex the com-
plaining party. Harassment under Rule 11 focuses upon the
improper purpose of the signer, objectively tested, rather than the
consequences of the signer's act, subjectively viewed by the signer's
opponent.
780 F.2d at 831-32.
7-1 See supra note 58 for a discussion of cases holding that Rule 11 is designed to
curb the filing of claims or motions which are not well grounded in fact and law.
76 Consider our hypothetical, in which the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the
defendant's reply because the defendant had failed to comply with a procedural
rule.
77 While it is theoretically possible to impose sanctions in some circuits on an
attorney who files a paper well grounded in fact and law, it is difficult to imagine
many situations in which the paper would objectively be deemed to have been
filed for an improper purpose. Realistically, if a hardball litigator tempers his zeal
with a little common sense, he can avoid sanctions under Rule 11. Only by filing
"excessive motions" can he be subjected to potential sanctions. Even then, he
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needed to control this type of misconduct. 78 Furthermore,
probably is protected if there is legal justification for his motion. See supra notes
69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of sanctions for the filing of exces-
sive motions.
78While district courts possess the power to sanction attorneys under other
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well, particularly under Rules 26(g) and 37,
these rules, like Rule 11, are not well-suited to curbing the type of conduct exem-
plified by our hypothetical. Rule 26(g) provides:
Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made
by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney .... The signature of the attorney... constitutes a certifi-
cation that the signer has read the request, response, or objection,
and that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and be-
lief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these
rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause un-
necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3)
not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the
needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount
in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). In the advisory committee note, the committee states that
"[t]he rule simply requires that the attorney make a reasonable inquiry into the
factual basis of his response, request, or objection." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advi-
sory committee's note. The committee states that the attorney's conduct should
be judged under "an objective standard similar to the one imposed by Rule 11."
Id. Accordingly, like Rule 11, Rule 26(g) may not be an effective sanctioning tool
against an attorney whose motion is objectively warranted by fact and law, but is
filed in bad faith. See supra notes 49-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this problem in the Rule II context.
Rule 37 provides, in part, that "[i]f a party ... fails to obey an order to provide
or permit discovery, . . . the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Among
other possible sanctions, including the treatment of the failure to obey the order
as contempt of court, the rule provides that the court may "require the party fail-
ing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or both to pay the reason-
able expenses, including attorneys' fees, caused by the failure, unless the court
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust." Id. However, Rule 37 is limited in its applicability
by the qualification that an attorney may not be sanctioned unless he violates a
court order. See Petroleum Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
106 F.R.D. 59, 65 (D. Mass. 1985) (sanctions cannot be imposed under Rule 37(b)
for failure to comply with a discovery request where no court order had been
entered compelling discovery). Finally, note that both Rules 26(b) and 37 relate
only to discovery, admittedly an area in which a large amount of hardball takes
place, but certainly not broad enough to cover all areas of hardball, including our
hypothetical situation. For a further discussion of sanctioning discovery abuse,
see Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse - The Recent Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Views from the Bench and Bar, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 671
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because it only applies to signed papers, Rule 11 is wholly
inappropriate to curb a wide range of other hardball tac-
tics prohibited by Dondi Properties, particularly those deal-
ing with the attorney's attitude and behavior toward his
adversaries and the court. 79 Federal courts that find Rule
11 or another Federal Rule of Civil Procedure lacking may
turn to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the inherent powers of the
court to find the authority to impose sanctions on attor-
neys who persistently play hardball.
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Section 1927 provides that any attorney who "multi-
plies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa-
tiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct."' 0 This provision is
designed to "curb dilatory practices and the abuse of
court processes by attorneys." 81 The virtue, and danger,
of section 1927 lies in its scope.8 2 Unlike Rule 11, section
1927 embraces everything done in federal court.8 3 It is
not limited to acts or omissions involving the signing of
papers not well grounded in fact or law, but encompasses
all types of multiplicative conduct by attorneys in federal
court.84 Courts have held that sanctions are appropriate
under section 1927 even in cases in which an attorney has
(1983); Comment, Sanctions under Amended Rule 26 - Scalpel or Meat-ax? The 1983
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 183 (1985).
71, See supra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Dondi Proper-
ties standards.
so 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). Until 1980, section 1927 imposed a burden only
for excess costs, which rarely amounted to a significant sum. Oliveri v. Thomp-
son, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, it produced very little liti-
gation. Id. However, since the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ushered in a new awareness of the sanctioning powers of the federal
courts, section 1927 has been utilized with a vengeance. SeeJoseph, supra note 50,
at 62.
, Colucci v. New York Times Co., 533 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
.2 See Joseph, supra note 50, at 62. For a discussion of the dangers of overzeal-
ous use of sanctioning power, see infra notes 146-176 and accompanying text.
,2 See Joseph, supra note 50, at 62.
Id. For a discussion of the applicability of Rule 11 to hardball conduct, see
notes 49-79 and accompanying text.
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not obviously violated any technical rules if, acting within
the rules, the attorney has proceeded in bad faith for the
purpose of delay or increasing the costs of litigation.85
The circuits are split on the question of whether an
award under section 1927 requires bad faith or merely ob-
jectively unreasonable conduct. The majority of courts
have held that standards for the imposition of sanctions
on an attorney under section 1927 must necessarily be
quite stringent, requiring a clear showing of bad faith, in
order to ensure that the prospect of sanctions does not
"chill the ardor of proper and forceful advocacy on behalf
of his client."86 An attorney should not be penalized sim-
ply for zealously pressing his client's interests.8 7 Other
- In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1187 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 450
(1987). Note, however, that the Yagman court held that if a technical rule is appli-
cable, sanctions under section 1927 are not appropriate. Id. The court held that
section 1927 could not be used to sanction attorneys for abuses of discovery, gov-
erned primarily by Rules 26 and 37. Id.; but see Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown,
115 F.R.D. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court used section 1927 and the inherent power
of the court to sanction an attorney for discovery abuse, generally governed by
Rules 26 and 37, after the attorney made repeated personal attacks on the oppos-
ing counsel during a deposition, calling him, among others, a "very rude and im-
pertinent young man" and an "obnoxious little twit").
- Colucci v. New York Times Co., 533 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
The Colucci court stated:
The thrust of [section 1927] is to curb dilatory practices and the
abuse of court processes by attorneys. The sanctions authorized
under section 1927 are not to be lightly imposed; nor are they to be
triggered because a lawyer vigorously and zealously pressed his cli-
ent's interests. The power to assess the fees against an attorney
should be exercised with restraint lest the prospect thereof chill the
ardor of proper and forceful advocacy on behalf of his client. To
justify the imposition of excess costs of litigation upon an attorney
his conduct must be of an egregious nature, stamped by bad faith
that is violative of recognized standards in the conduct of litigation.
This section is directed against attorneys who willfully abuse judicial
processes.
Id. at 1013-14 (footnote omitted); see also Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273 ("Imposition of
a sanction under § 1927 requires a 'clear showing of bad faith' "); Ford v. Temple
Hosp., 790 F.2d 342, 347 (3d Cir. 1986)(there must be a finding of willful bad
faith on the part of the offending attorney before sanctions may be imposed under
section 1927); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 768 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir.
1985)(power to assess costs under section 1927 is power that must be strictly con-
strued and utilized only in instances evidencing serious and standard disregard
for orderly process ofjustice).
"7 Colucci, 533 F. Supp. at 1014.
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courts have held that section 1927 may be imposed on any
attorney who unreasonably multiplies the proceedings in
a case, regardless of whether he has acted in bad faith.88
While this is a significant issue in many cases, where sub-
jective good faith might act as a "safe harbor" against
sanctions even though the attorney has proceeded unrea-
sonably,89 it is not of similar significance in discussing
many types of hardball conduct, in which the attorney is
almost invariably proceeding in bad faith.90 Accordingly,
section 1927 may be particularly appropriate to our hypo-
thetical situation, in which the plaintiff violated no techni-
cal rules, other than the nebulous Dondi Properties
standards, but proceeded in bad faith.9
- See Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986)(where
attorney knows or reasonably should know that the claim pursued is frivolous or
that litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct litigation of nonfrivolous claims, trial
court may assess fees attributable to such action against attorney under section
1927). The Jones court indicated that the standard for the imposition of sanctions
under section 1927 was less stringent than the bad faith standard used to shift
attorneys' fees under a court's inherent powers. Id. "To hold that subjective 'bad
faith' remains as necessary under amended § 1927 as under Roadway Express would
be to assume that the [statute adds] nothing to the 'inherent powers' recognized
in that case." Id.; see infra notes 98-121 for a discussion of Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980), and the inherent powers of federal courts.
" See, e.g., Sherman Treaters Ltd. v. Ahlbrandt, 115 F.R.D. 519, 525 (D.D.C.
1987) (although counsel for plaintiff in patent infringement action failed to meet
standard of reasonableness required by Rule 11 in pursuing action without appre-
hending reasonably whether the defendant authorized infringing party to act as its
licensee, such conduct was not vexatious or unreasonable for purposes of section
1927).
sx, Note that proving bad faith on the part of a hardball attorney may not always
be easy, especially in situations like our hypothetical, in which his position has
objective merit. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the hypothetical situation; see infra notes 122-145 and accompanying text for a
discussion of an attorney's right to a hearing before the imposition of sanctions.
1,1 Subjective bad faith means more than "vigorously and zealously" asserting a
client's interest. Colucci, 553 F. Supp. at 1014. An attorney's conduct must be of
"an egregious nature, stamped by bad faith that is violative of recognized stan-
dards in the conduct of litigation." Id. On the other hand, assuming that the
Dondi Properties standards would qualify as "recognized standards in the conduct of
litigation," at least in the Northern District of Texas, a violation of these standards
might be evidence of subjective bad faith on the part of the attorney. One poten-
tial problem arises from the suggestion in Yagman that section 1927 does not ap-
ply to a situation which should be governed by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
See Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1187. Accordingly, a court could possibly hold that Rule
11 exclusively applies to our hypothetical. If Rule 11 sanctions are not appropri-
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In some circuits, however, even bad faith may not be
sufficient to impose sanctions under section 1927. Some
courts have imposed the additional requirement that the
attorney's claim must lack a colorable basis in fact or law
before sanctions are appropriate under this provision.
92
For example, in Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore,93 the Seventh Circuit held that sanctions against
an attorney under section 1927 were inappropriate. 94 Be-
cause the claim was not so frivolous or unreasonable as to
justify sanctions under Rule 11, the court held that an
award of sanctions under section 1927 was also "clearly
unwarranted." 95 This approach emasculates the sanction-
ing power of section 1927. By tying section 1927 sanc-
tions to the merits of an attorney's complaint, this
provision simply parallels the authority of federal courts
to sanction attorneys under Rule 11.96 Section 1927 be-
comes nothing more than a redundancy. Moreover, this
section becomes useless to deter the type of conduct evi-
dent in our hypothetical situation, in which the plaintiff's
motion was well-grounded in fact and law, but filed in bad
faith. 97 Clearly, in circuits adhering to this restrictive view
ate, then section 1927 sanctions are similarly inappropriate. For a discussion of
this issue raised by Yagman, see supra note 85.
112 See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177,
182 (7th Cir. 1985)("Before a court may assess fees under section 1927, the attor-
ney must intentionally file or prosecute a claim that lacks a plausible legal or fac-
tual basis"); Day v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (S.D. Tex.),
appeal dismissed, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985)
(In discussing section 1927 sanctions, the court stated, "Moreover, while lack of
merit of the action is evidence of bad faith, the claim must also lack a colorable
basis in law to justify an award of fees.").
w, 775 F.2d at 177.
114 Id. at 180. This case arose out of the continuing litigation between the Colts
football franchise, which moved from Baltimore to Indianapolis, and the city of
Baltimore, which attempted to prevent the move by exercising its eminent domain
powers over the team. Id. at 179. The instant case concerned the validity of an
interpleader claim filed by the Colts to bring into the suit the Indiana corporation
owning the Hoosier Dome, where the Colts had agreed to play their games. Id
Id. at 180.
See supra notes 49-79 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the
sanctioning power of federal courts under Rule 11.
0, See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hypothet-
ical situation.
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of section 1927, a court will need to look elsewhere to find
appropriate sanctioning power in our hypothetical.
C. Inherent Powers
If a court finds that Rule 11 and section 1927 do not
provide appropriate sanctioning power in our hypotheti-
cal situation, it might turn to its inherent powers. 98 The
inherent powers of federal courts are those which are nec-
essary to the exercise of all others. 99 They are derived
from the "control necessarily vested in the courts to man-
age their own affairs."'10 They also are extraordinarily
broad.' 0 ' For example, the contempt power is rooted in
the inherent power of the judiciary,10 2 as, are the powers
of a court to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, 0 3
98 See, e.g., Petroleum Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 106
F.R.D. 59 (D. Mass. 1985)(although neither Rule 26, Rule 37, nor section 1927
authorizes imposition of sanctions for plaintiff's failure to produce certain docu-
ments to answer fully certain interrogatories where no order compelling discovery
was issued and where plaintiff's conduct was negligent but not intentional, court
has inherent power to order continuance and to require plaintiff and his counsel
to pay reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, which will be incurred by
defendants in re-preparing their case during continuance).
w, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); see also United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). In Hudson, the Supreme
Court stated:
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts ofjus-
tice from the nature of their institution.... To fine for contempt -
imprison for contumacy - [e]nforce the observance of order .... are
powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far our Courts no
doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute. ...
Id.
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
I' Joseph, supra note 50, at 64.
-2 Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (1960)("From the very beginning
of this Nation and throughout its history the power to convict for criminal con-
tempt has been deemed an essential and inherent aspect of the very existence of
our courts.").
I- Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. at 630.
The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution
has generally been considered an "inherent power," governed not
by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.
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to disqualify counsel, 0 4 to vacate a final judgment for
fraud on the court, 0 5 or to disbar, suspend, or reprimand
counsel. 106
The inherent power has also been used to award attor-
neys' fees and litigation costs where the losing party has
"acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppres-
sive reasons."'' 0 7 Awards under this inherent power may
be made either against the losing party or against the los-
ing party's attorney.'0 8 The bad faith exception permit-
ting the award of attorney's fees is not limited to
situations in which an action isfiled in bad faith.' 0 9 In Lip-
1..4 Kleiner v. First' Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209 (lith Cir.
1985)("A trial judge possesses the inherent power to discipline counsel for mis-
conduct, short of behavior giving rise to disbarment or criminal censure, without
resort to the powers of civil or criminal contempt."). The court stated that
"[c]ourts possess the inherent power to protect the orderly administration ofjus-
tice and to preserve the dignity of the tribunal." Id.
-.1 Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580
(1946) ("The inherent power of a federal court to investigate whether a judgment
was obtained by fraud, is beyond question.").
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
Inherent power has been frequently invoked by the courts to regu-
late the conduct of members of the bar as well as to provide tools for
docket management. Courts have thus relied on the concept of in-
herent power to impose several species of sanctions on those who
abuse the judicial process.
Id.; see also Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 386 (2d Cir.
198 1)(A federal district court must be able "to protect the administration of jus-
tice by levying sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices."). For an ex-
cellent overview of the inherent powers of federal courts, see Eash, 757 F.2d at
560-65.
",,7 F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber, 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974); accord Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975);
see also Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th Cir. 1986) ("There is
no doubt that a federal district court, in the sound exercise of its discretion, may
assess attorneys' fees against losing counsel as well as against a losing party.") (em-
phasis original). The "American Rule" ordinarily requires parties to bear their
own counsel fees and other litigation expenses. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
.... Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 918 (1987); see, e.g., Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d
329, 344 (2d Cir. 1986)(award made against party); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698
F.2d 61, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983) (award made
against attorney).
,, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980); see Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)(" '[B]ad faith' may be found, not only in the actions that led
to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation."); Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1272
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sig v. National Student Marketing Corp.,l10 the D.C. Circuit
stated that "even assuming good faith in the filing of the
counterclaim, other dilatory tactics during the litigation
would justify the award of attorney's fees.""'
The Lipsig court further stated that attorneys' fees may
be awarded even against a winning party or his attor-
neys." 2 The assertion of a colorable claim by an attorney
will not bar the assessment of attorneys' fees against him
if his claim was filed in bad faith." 13 Thus, under the Lipsig
view, the plaintiff in our hypothetical could be sanctioned
for filing the motion to strike in bad faith, even though it
was well grounded in fact and law." 1
4
The inherent power also enables district, courts to make
("An inherent power award may be imposed either for commencing or continuing
an action in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.").
1]( 663 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(if a litigant is substantially motivated by vin-
dictiveness, the assertion of a colorable claim by him will not bar assessment of
attorneys' fees against him).
I Id. at 182. The court further stated, "While the presence of merit in a claim
or defense may well negate any motion of bad faith in itsfiling, it certainly cannot
justify abuse of the judicial process in the methodology of its prosecution. Id. (empha-
sis original).
112 Id. The court stated, "[I]ndeed, even a winner may have to pay obstinacy
fees." Id.
,- Id. The trial court had held, "[Wihere a litigant is substantially motivated by
vindictiveness, obduracy or mala fides, the assertion of a colorable claim will not
bar the assessment of attorneys' fees against him." Id. The D.C. Circuit stated
that the trial court "was eminently correct in its reasoning." Id.
114 Some circuits, however, have not accepted the views of the Lipsig court. In
Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1265, the Second Circuit enacted a far more restrictive stan-
dard for awarding attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception. In order to en-
sure that persons with colorable claims would not be deterred from pressing those
claims, the court stated that the bad faith exception requires clear evidence that
the challenged actions are entirely without color and are taken for the purpose of
harassment or delay. Id. at 1272. The court stated:
To ensure, however, that fear of an award of attorneys' fees against
them will not deter persons with colorable claims from pursuing
those claims, we have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith
exception absent both "clear evidence" that the challenged actions
"are entirely without color, and [are taken] for reasons of harass-
ment or delay or for other improper purposes" and "a high degree
of specificity in the factual findings of [the] lower courts."
Id. (quoting Dow Chem., 782 F.2d at 344). Under this restrictive view, the plaintiff
could not be sanctioned in our hypothetical because the motion to strike was war-
ranted by fact and law. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the hypothetical situation.
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local rules governing the conduct of court business, pro-
vided that the rules promulgated are consistent with acts
of Congress and rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court.' 1 5 District courts may make local rules that impose
reasonable sanctions when "an attorney conducts himself
in a manner unbecoming a member of the bar, fails to
comply with any rule of the court, including local rules, or
takes actions in bad faith." '" 6 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has stated that a district court's inherent authority
over members of the bar is not limited to regulating con-
duct covered by a local rule,"17 and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83 expressly provides that district courts may
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 8 Accordingly,
it seems clear that the Northern District of Texas has the
power to promulgate and enforce the standards contained
in Dondi Properties as part of its inherent powers.' 19
The principal limitation on federal courts in imposing
inherent power sanctions is the general rule that sanctions
may be imposed only upon a finding of bad faith. 20 Note,
Eash, 757 F.2d at 569; see 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
Eash, 757 F.2d at 569; see also Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710
F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983); Martinez v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Co., 593 F.2d
992, 994 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1976).
III Eash, 757 F.2d at 568.
"" FED. R. Civ. P. 83. Rule 83 provides:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may
from time to time ... make and amend rules governing its practice
not inconsistent with these rules .... [Moreover], [i]n all cases not
provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regu-
late their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or
those of the district in which they act.
Id.
Note that because it satisfies the notice requirements of the due process
clause, Dondi Properties may actually add to the inherent power of courts to sanc-
tion hardball conduct. See infra notes 127-132 for a discussion of the requirement
of notice before sactions can be imposed.
121 Joseph, supra note 50, at 64; see also supra notes 107-117 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the requirement of finding bad faith before an award of
attorneys' fees can be made under a court's inherent powers. Note that one cir-
cuit suggested that a lesser standard might be applicable when counsel, rather
than a party, is the offender; see McCandless v. Great A & P Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198
(7th Cir. 1983).
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however, that courts may not necessarily need to make a
finding of subjective bad faith in cases in which the court
is imposing sanctions for violating a local rule of the
court, rather than simply relying on its general inherent-
powers. 12  Either way, our hypothetical attorney, who
filed a bad-faith motion in violation of the local standard
which required him to cooperate with opposing counsel,
may be sanctioned by the court for his actions. Of course,
in sanctioning an attorney, a district court must comply
with all procedural due process requirements.
IV. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Attorneys facing possible sanctions have interests which
qualify for protection under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 22  Procedural due process requires
12 See In re Sutter, 543 F.2d at 1035 (unnecessary to find a willful disregard or
disobedience of court's authority to impose sanctions under a local rule; reckless-
ness is sufficient, but not mere inadvertence). Because the plaintiff in our hypo-
thetical was violating a written standard of the court, a proof of bad faith may not
be necessary. Note, however, that the Dondi Properties standards have not been
formally adopted as local rules. This may or may not be significant. At least one
court, in the due process context, see infra notes 122-145 and accompanying dis-
cussion, has suggested that adequate prior notice of sanctionable conduct could
come not only from local and federal rules and statutes, but also from local cus-
tom, an ethical canon, a court order, or a court admonition. See Eash, 757 F.2d at
571. Arguably, the same logic should apply to the present context as well. It
should not matter whether the Dondi Properties standards can technically be charac-
terized as local rules. On the other hand, because Dondi Properties involves inher-
ently subjective standards, such as the attorney's failure to cooperate, bad faith
may be required merely to prove that the standard was violated in the first place.
In that case, the distinction between local rules and inherent power sanctions
would be irrelevant.
122 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980)("Like other sanc-
tions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice
and an opportunity for a hearing on the record"); see, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819
F.2d 1551, 1558 (11 th Cir. 1987) (due process required for Rule 11 sanctions);
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570 (3d Cir. 1985)(due process re-
quired for sanctions under inherent power of the court); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee's note ("The procedure [for sanctions] obviously must com-
port with due process requirements."); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1234, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2781, 2782-83 ("Before
sanctioning an attorney under Section 1927, the court is to afford the attorney all
appropriate protection of due process available under the law.")(quoted in Com-
mittee on Federal Courts, Procedural Rights of Attorneys Facing Sanctions, 40 THE
RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 313, 319
250 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
that an individual be given both notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard before the government may deprive him
of any property interest.123 The form which these proce-
'dural protections must take in a particular situation is de-
termined by "an evaluation of all the circumstances and
an accommodation of competing interests."' 24  The spe-
cific dictates of due process in a given situation will be
determined by the interaction of several competing fac-
tors.125 Principally, these factors include the attorney's in-
terest in having a sanction imposed only if it is justified,
the risk of an erroneous imposition of sanctions and the
probable value of additional notice and hearing in reduc-
ing the chances for error, and the interests ofjudicial effi-
ciency and the administrative burdens that additional
procedural requirements would entail. 26 In short, the at-
(1985)); see generally Schwarzer, supra note 51, at 202-05; Committee on Federal
Courts, supra, at 313; Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Toward Judicial Restraint, 36 WASH-
BURN L.J. 337, 361-65 (1987).
". Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). The property interest in-
volved is, of course, the monetary sanction imposed on the attorney. An attorney
also has a property interest in his license to practice law; cf. Barry v. Barchi, 443
U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (property interest in a horse-training license sufficient to in-
yoke protection of the Due Process Clause); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10
n.7 (1979) (Due Process Clause applies to state's suspension of a driver's license),
for cases supporting the proposition that the holder of a state-issued license has a
property right in that license. Note that more is at stake in sanction hearings than
simply a property interest. A lawyer's professional reputation is also stigmatized
by the imposition of sanctions for violating recognized litigation standards. See
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir.
1986) ("What is at stake is often not merely the monetary sanction but the law-
yer's reputation."); Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 579 F. Supp.
657, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850
(1985) (imposition of sanctions condemns an attorney's professional conduct and
reputation).
,24 Eash, 757 F.2d at 570; see Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)("The very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.").
12-. See Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1558.
126 Id. The Donaldson court stated that "[p]roviding due process will ensure that
Rule 11 will not be applied arbitrarily, that erroneous application of the rule will
be minimized, and that creative legal arguments and vigorous advocacy will not be
stifled." Id. The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335(1976), laid down the following principles:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally re-
quires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private inter-
est that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
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torney's right to fairness and accuracy must be weighed
against the court's need to act quickly and decisively.
Due process first requires that an attorney have fair no-
tice of the possible imposition of sanctions and the reason'
for their imposition. 127 The adequacy of a particular form
of notice turns, to a large extent, on the knowledge that
the attorney has of the consequences of his own con-
duct. 28  Thus, fundamental fairness may require some
form of prior notice to an attorney that his conduct may
be subject to discipline or sanction by a court. 129 It is here
that Dondi Properties comes into play. Some courts have
suggested that adequate prior notice of sanctionable con-
duct could come from local and federal rules and statutes,
local custom, an ethical canon, a court order, or a court
admonition. 30 Under this view, the existence of the Dondi
Properties opinion in itself constitutes notice that violations
of the standards contained therein will be sanctionable.131
An attorney can hardly assert that he did not know what
was expected of him if a well-publicized opinion of the
court spells out in detail the expected standards of con-,
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.
.27 Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950), the Supreme Court held, "An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present
their objections." Id.
128 See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962)("The adequacy of notice
and hearing respecting proceedings that may affect a party's rights turns, to a
large extent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show such party to have
of the consequences of his own conduct.").
129 See Eash, 757 F.2d at 571.
," Id.
Cf Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560. The court indicated:
The existence of Rule 11 itself constitutes a form of notice since the
rule imposes an affirmative duty on an attorney to conduct a reason-
able inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed; an
attorney could not assert that he or she had no notice or knowledge
of the standards of conduct that the rule itself provides.
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duct for all attorneys appearing before it. The only re-
maining due process question is whether an oral hearing
is required before sanctions can be imposed on the
attorney. 1 3 2
In Rule 11 cases, while a formal hearing may or may not
be required by the particular circumstances, 3 3 the attor-
ney must at least be given an opportunity to respond,
orally or in writing, to the imposition of sanctions and to
justify his action. 34  The advisory committee notes to
Rule 11 state that the particular format to be followed
"should depend on the circumstances of the situation and
the severity of the sanction under consideration." 135 In
1-2 One possible problem is that the Dondi Properties standards are rather nebu-
lous. An attorney has no precise knowledge of what type of conduct will activate
its sanctions. However, a warning by the court at the first sign of abusive conduct
might satisfy any notice requirements not met by the standards themselves.
1.1 Cf Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767 (hearing required before imposition of
sanctions under inherent power) and Eash, 757 F.2d at 570 ("we believe that as a
general practice a monetary detriment should not be imposed by a court without
prior notice and some occasion to respond") with Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d
1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) (due process does not
necessarily require that an evidentiary hearing be held in all Rule 11 cases; here
the judge's participation in the proceedings provided him with full knowledge of
the relevant facts and therefore the procedures followed by the district court did
not violate due process) and Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 596 F. Supp. 13,
27-28 (N.D. Ill. 1984)("It would be of no value to hold a hearing at which plain-
tiff's attorneys could explain to me why they felt it necessary to festoon their com-
plaint with frivolous claims .... ).
'.4 See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11 th Cir. 1987). The Donald-
son court stated:
The accused must be given an opportunity to respond, orally or in
writing as may be appropriate, to the invocation of Rule 11 and tojustify his or her actions. Rule 11 does not require that a hearing
separate from trial or other pretrial hearings be held on Rule II
charges before sanctions can be imposed; indeed the Advisory Com-
mittee Note indicates that the contrary is preferable .... Whether
and to what extent additional hearing is required will vary depend-
ing upon the nature of the case. The Advisory Committee note indi-
cates some of the matters to be considered: (I) the circumstances in
general; (2) the type and severity of the sanction under considera-
tion; and (3) the judge's participation in the proceedings, the judge's
knowledge of the facts, and whether there is need for further
inquiry.
Id. at 1560-61; see FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note.
I" FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. The note further indicates:
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective oper-
ation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satel-
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many situations, the judge's participation in the proceed-
ings will provide him with full knowledge of the relevant
facts and little further inquiry will be necessary.' 3 6 On the
other hand, when a court must resolve an issue of credi-
bility or determine whether a good faith argument can be
made for a particular legal position, the risk of error and
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards
are likely to be greater. 37 In that case, a separate hearing
on the imposition of sanctions may be required.
38
It should be noted that Rule 11 employs an objective
standard of reasonableness.139 A hearing will be far more
essential in the context of sanction motions made under
the Dondi Properties standards, which to a large extent are
concerned with the subjective bad faith of attorneys.
Under the inherent powers of the court and section 1927,
which employ subjective bad faith standards, 40 courts
have held that sanctions must be predicated on a hearing
concerning the issue of an attorney's bad faith.' 4 ' Thus,
lite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the
extent possible limit the scope of the sanction proceedings to the
record. Thus, discovery should be conducted only by leave of court,
and then only in extraordinary circumstances.
Id.
Id.
17 Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1561.
1- Id.; see infra notes 132-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
requirement of a hearing before the imposition of sanctions for bad faith conduct.
, See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the objective
standard in Rule 11 cases.
-. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bad faith
standard under section 1927; see supra notes 111-121 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the bad faith standard under the inherent powers of the court.
- See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767 (sanctions under the inherent power of
the federal courts "should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an
opportunity for a hearing on the record"); United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d
608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983). The Blodgett court stated:
While on the facts we cannot conclude that the district court erred in
finding that the appeal was frivolous, the mere fact that an appeal is
frivolous does not of itself establish bad faith. To establish bad faith
[under section 1927] on this record, a hearing was required to deter-
mine if the appeal was taken solely for purposes of delay.
Id.; Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir. 1984) (before
assessing attorney's fees under section 1927, "a court should provide counsel with
some opportunity to be heard"); Miles v. Dickson, 387 F.2d 716, 717 (5th Cir.
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before sanctions may be imposed under Dondi Properties, a
hearing will almost invariably be necessary to allow coun-
sel to justify their actions. 42
This conclusion necessarily raises the concern that ex-
cessive satellite litigation will clog the federal courts. Liti-
gation over sanctions under Dondi Properties-type
standards could easily take as much or more time than
hardball tactics currently cost the system. The Dondi
Properties court expressed a desire to avoid this prob-
lem. 43 But is this a realistic goal? The court also stated
that it intended "to take the steps necessary to ensure that
justice is not removed from the reach of litigants either
because improper litigation tactics interpose unnecessary
delay or because such actions increase the cost of litiga-
tion beyond the litigant's financial grasp."' 44  Clearly,
these conflicting goals must be carefully balanced against
one another in order for Dondi Properties to effectively curb
hardball conduct. 145 If such a balance cannot be achieved,
perhaps the Dondi Properties standards should not, or can-
,not, be enforced.
V. SHOULD DONDI PROPERTIES BE ENFORCED?
A. Cooperation v. Zealous Advocacy
This comment has already noted that a handful of hard-
ball lawyers are abusing the court system through the use
1967) ("To assess the costs against the attorneys [under section 1927] without
notice and a hearing was, of course, wrong."); see also Rothenberg v. Security Man-
agement Co., 736 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (11 th Cir. 1984) (where sanctions were sup-
ported only by conclusory statements concerning bad faith, imposition of
sanctions was vacated and remanded to district court to indicate the factual basis
for its findings to facilitate appellate review); see generally Committee on Federal
Courts, supra note 122, at 319, 326.
,42 See supra note 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the require-
ment of a hearing before the imposition of sanctions for bad faith conduct.
143 Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 288 ("We do not, by adopting these standards,
invite satellite litigation of the kind we now see in the context of Fed. R. Civ. P. II
motions. To do so would defeat the fundamental premise which motivates our
action.").
144 Id.
4. See infra notes 163-176 for further discussion of the satellite litigation
problem.
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of dilatory tactics which waste both the time and the re-
sources of attorneys and judges. 46 Most attorneys will
not dispute the fact that such abusive conduct should be
curtailed in the interests ofjustice. ' 47 But if "hardball" is
not simply a description of abusive practices, but is really
a description of a pervasive mind-set towards litigation
possessed by a number of attorneys, 48 can the courts ef-
fectively govern an attorney's general attitude and behav-
'1' See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the detrimen-
tal effect of hardball tactics on the court system.
147 See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the views of the
opponents of hardball litigation tactics; but see supra note 8 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the views of hardball's advocates.
'1" See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hardball
mentality. Some have suggested that the underlying problem behind hardball tac-
tics is that certain young law firms are unable to, or simply do not want to, break
into the "good old boy" network, in which technical rules are often ignored for
the convenience of attorneys, regardless of whether this is effective client advo-
cacy. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 51. Others have attacked this idea as ludi-
crous. See Sayler, supra note 2, at 80. "The notion is that civilized conduct is for
the monied, the boring, the timid, the conservative - but not for the creative and
the free-spirited. This is bonkers." Id. Whatever the merit of these respective
arguments, it must be acknowledged that a certain tension exists between "main-
stream" firms and "hardball" firms. This tension creates mistrust and prevents
judicial processes from running smoothly. Accordingly, it is a problem which
must be addressed, although perhaps more appropriately by the bar than by the
judiciary. Bar associations may be in a better position to encourage these groups
to meet and work out their differences than are judges, who, as outsiders, are
somewhat insulated from conflicts within the bar.
At least one bar association has apparently agreed. The Bar of the City of New
York recently published a proposed code of litigation conduct. Committee on
Federal Courts, A Proposed Code of Litigation Conduct, 43 THE RECORD OF THE Asso-
CIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CIrY OF NEw YORK 738 (1988). Like Dondi Properties,
the proposed code focuses on intangibles like civility and cooperation between
attorneys. The Committee states:
The kind of conduct that is the subject of this report is not the sort
that is proscribed, for the most part, by the canons of ethics or even
by judicial interpretations of Rule 11. We are interested more in
conduct that is legal, ethical, and usually beyond the reach of sanc-
tions, but is nevertheless, in our view, improper. Such conduct,
although both legal and ethical, tends to violate the appropriate re-
lationships among lawyers. It is the kind of conduct that makes life
at the bar more difficult for lawyers and clients, and unnecessarily
so. We hope that by suggesting rules of conduct, we will provide
some guidance to the bar and initiate a debate about where proper
lines should be drawn.
Id. at 738.
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ior? If so, should they attempt to do so? This section will
examine the possible responses to these questions.
The Dondi Properties court stated that attorneys have a
duty not to unreasonably or arbitrarily refuse to cooper-
ate with the opposing counsel.' 4 9 However, it may be dif-
ficult to determine whether an attorney is refusing to
cooperate because he is complying with his duty to zeal-
ously pursue the interests of his client,' 50 or whether he is
simply acting in bad faith. The boundary between sanc-
tionable and legitimate conduct is unquestionably vague
in this context."5 ' Just how cooperative an attorney is re-
quired to be will probably depend upon the particular sit-
uation. The problem lies in deciding where to draw the
line.
41 Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 287-88. At least in part, the Dondi Properties
court may have promulgated its litigation standards with an eye toward certain
hardball firms which were not actually involved in either the Dondi or the Knight
cases. In Dallas, there is a growing tension between mainstream and hardball
firms. See supra note 148 for a general discussion of such tension. Referring to
one of the "hardball firms" in town, an attorney from an old-guard Dallas firm
stated, "The reputation they're developing, whether deserved or not, is that
they're behaving in a fashion that is not the Dallas way. Dallas lawyers are gentle-
men to each other. These two act like New York lawyers." Quotes, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1, 1989, at 35. The Dondi Properties standards may have been promulgated in or-
der to help to preserve the "Dallas way." The assumption underlying this quota-
tion may also help to explain why a case such as Dondi Properties arose in the
Northern District of Texas rather than another federal district, such as the South-
ern District of New York. But see Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 148, at
738 (indicating that lawyers in New York are also dissatisfied with hardball
tactics).
'1 See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS' CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT Pream-
ble (1987)("To his client, a lawyer owes undivided allegiance, the utmost applica-
tion of his learning, skill and industry, and the employment of all appropriate
legal means within the law to protect and enforce legitimate interests.").
1-5 Consider the special problems inherent in regulating some types of hardball
tactics. If the problem is an attorney's arguably unreasonable insistence on com-
pliance with obscure technical rules, it is difficult to justify the imposition of sanc-
tions for zealously insisting that the opposing party comply with those rules, even
if such insistence may be detrimental to the system. It may be that the problem is
not with the attorney, but with the rules themselves. If the rules are so compli-
cated that an attorney who insists on compliance with them is considered to be
acting in bad faith, then the rules should be simplified. This rather simplistic con-
clusion of course raises a host of additional issues. Fundamental changes in the
rules are not likely to occur overnight. On the other hand, such changes should
perhaps at least be considered.
In Cheng v. GAF Corp. ,152 the Second Circuit reversed an
award of attorneys' fees and expenses to appellee GAF
Corporation (GAF) for the costs of defending against ap-
pellant Cheng's allegedly unreasonable and vexatious at-
tempts to disqualify GAF's counsel. 5 ' The court found
that Cheng's motion not only was not frivolous or unrea-
sonable, but in light of a prior decision of the Second Cir-
cuit supporting disqualification, his attorney "may have
been ethically obliged to pursue his disqualification ef-
forts." 154 Had Cheng been faced with the duty to cooper-
ate under Dondi Properties, he might have failed to seek
disqualification even if it had been in the best interests of
his client.
Accordingly, courts must be careful that the threat of
sanctions does not become oppressive, creating a chilling
effect on legitimate advocacy.' 55 Consider our hypotheti-
cal.' 56 The plaintiff's attorney has a duty to employ "all
appropriate legal means within the law to protect and en-
force legitimate interests."'' 57 While he should not vexa-
tiously make unwarranted motions which do not
significantly affect the interests of his client, if the motion
has even a chance of success, he may have an ethical duty
to file it.' 58 The fact that he did so with a Rambo-like
713 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 887. Cheng filed an employment discrimination suit against GAF.
Cheng was represented by Legal Services for the Elderly Poor (LSEP). GAF was
represented by the law firm of Epstein, Becker, Borsody & Green, P.C. (the Ep-
stein firm). During the course of litigation, an attorney from LSEP left that firm
for the Epstein firm. Cheng then moved to disqualify the Epstein firm, alleging
that the attorney who had left LSEP had been privy to confidential information
regarding Cheng's suit. Id.
,-4 Id. at 891. The court noted that under the Canons of the American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility, there exists at least the appear-
ance of impropriety. Id. at 887-88.
I.- See Colucci v. New York Times Co., 533 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) ("The power to assess the fees against an attorney should be exercised with
restraint lest the prospect thereof chill the ardor of proper and forceful advocacy
on behalf of his client.").
1.- See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hypo-
thetical situation.
157 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYER'S CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT Preamble
(1987).
,- Cf id.; Cheng, 713 F.2d at 891.
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mentality may be morally reprehensible, but it may not be
validly sanctionable.
In order to maintain the proper balance between coop-
eration with opposing parties on the one hand, and zeal-
ous client advocacy on the other hand, courts must apply
the Dondi Properties standards with wisdom and restraint. 159
Perhaps the most appropriate way to achieve this balance
is to apply the standards only to "clearly unthinkable" ac-
tions,160 rather than to borderline cases such as the one in
our hypothetical. This solution will serve two functions.
First, because sanctions will be appropriate only in the
most egregious cases, the Dondi Properties standards will
not chill legitimate advocacy. Second, the higher stan-
dard of "clearly unthinkable" will reduce the likelihood
that a party opposing a motion will routinely claim that his
opponent has failed to cooperate and file a motion for
sanctions under Dondi Properties as a hardball tactic of his
own. '6 If Dondi Properties applies only in extraordinary
circumstances, it is less likely to be wrongfully invoked
every time an attorney is displeased with his adversary's
conduct or demeanor.
On the other hand, if the courts do not limit the appli-
cability of these standards to egregious cases, the threat of
sanctions under Dondi Properties "will cast an ominous
shadow over federal courts" which will chill legitimate ad-
vocacy and perhaps prevent parties from asserting merito-
rious claims or defenses. 6 2 The Dondi Properties standards
are designed to increase the efficiency of federal courts.
However, efficiency should not be achieved at the expense
of fairness. A higher standard for the imposition of sanc-
'9M Cf Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1086 (7th Cir.
1987)("I continue to believe that the 1983 amendment of Rule 11 was sound in
concept, but it will surely defeat its own purpose if not applied with wisdom and
restraint.").
I.. Cf Shaffer, Rule ]I: Bright Light, Dim Future, 7 REv. OF LITIGATION 1, 32
(1987)("unless Rule 11 is put on the shelf and applied only to 'unthinkable'
claims, it will cast an ominous shadow over federal courts").
"" See infra notes 168-171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the will-
ingness of courts to sanction frivolous motions for sanctions.
" Shaffer, supra note 160, at 32.
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tions under Dondi Properties should provide a proper bal-
ance between efficiency and accuracy. As long as they act
reasonably, attorneys will be free to pursue zealously the
interests of their clients. Only when they engage in
clearly unthinkable conduct that delays the administration
ofjustice will they be sanctioned for their conduct. While
it is admittedly not flawless, particularly because of the
difficulty of determining whether particular conduct is or
is not clearly unthinkable, this standard should adequately
serve the interests of clients, as well as the court system.
B. Satellite Litigation
Satellite litigation poses another serious problem. An
example of the magnitude of this problem in the Rule 11
context is found in Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New
York, 163 in which the Second Circuit ruled on a Rule 1 1
dispute for the second time. The court had earlier re-
versed the trial court's refusal to award sanctions against a
plaintiff who filed a frivolous civil rights action and re-
manded the case for proper sanctions to be imposed.'6 4
On remand, the trial court imposed a sanction of $1,000
on the plaintiff. 16 5 This did not satisfy the Second Circuit,
which modified the sanction award to $10,000.166 Thus,
sanctions were awarded for a violation of Rule 11 only af-
ter two trips to the Second Circuit and denial of a petition
for certiorari by the Supreme Court.' 67 It is not difficult
821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987) [hereinafter EastwayI'.
'- Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1985)
[hereinafter Eastway I].
-. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
,, Eastway 11, 821 F.2d at 122.
,67 This situation led one commentator to conclude, "Eastway I and Eastway H
are prime examples that the use and application of Rule 11 are frustrating the
Rule's purposes." Shaffer, supra note 160, at 26. Shaffer further stated, "If noth-
ing else, [there is] a marked disagreement among judges on how Rule 11 is to be
used, and this disagreement is spawning litigation and judicial nuances that un-
dermine the laudable purposes of the Rule." Id. at 31.
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to imagine district and appellate court dockets filled with
similar cases under Dondi Properties.
The satellite litigation problem may be magnified fur-
ther if courts are willing to impose sanctions under Dondi
Properties against attorneys who file frivolous motions for
sanctions. In Aircraft Trading & Services, Inc. v. Branif,
Inc. ,168 Aircraft Trading moved for sanctions against Bran-
iff for bringing a frivolous appeal.' 69  After concluding
that Braniff's appeal was well-supported in fact and law,
the court stated that Aircraft Trading's motion for sanc-
tions itself bordered on the frivolous. 70 While the court
did not sanction Aircraft Trading in this case, it did indi-
cate a willingness to sanction in the future attorneys who
bring frivolous requests for sanctions.t'7
Accordingly, consider this nightmare based on our hy-
pothetical: The defendant files a motion in violation of a
local rule. The plaintiff, acting possibly in bad faith,
moves to strike the motion. The defendant then moves
for sanctions against the plaintiff for failure to comply
with the Dondi Properties standards. The plaintiff then
moves for sanctions because the defendant also violated
the duty to cooperate imposed by Dondi Properties.'72 The
court must now hold a hearing173 and attempt to deter-
mine who is to blame and whether anyone has acted in
bad faith.' 74  The courts could conceivably be clogged
with hundreds of variations of this scenario. Dondi Proper-
ties expressed an intention to avoid excessive satellite liti-
1- 819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 163 (1987).
nw Id. at 1236. Aircraft Trading characterized Braniff's appeal as "totally lack-
ing in merit, framed with no relevant supporting law, conclusory in nature, and
utterly unsupported by the evidence." Id.
170 Id.
17' Id. "Appellees' request for sanctions therefore borders on the frivolous, and
we caution that we will not hesitate to impose appropriate penalties in the future
for frivolous requests for sanctions." Id.
,7. See Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 287.
17. See supra notes 122-145 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possi-
ble requirement of a hearing before sanctions can be imposed on an attorney.
'74 For a discussion of bad faith in the context of section 1927, see supra notes
86-92 and accompanying discussion. For a discussion of bad faith in the context
of the inherent power of the courts, see supra notes 111-121.
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gation. 7 -5 If it cannot effectively do so, problems with
satellite litigation may defeat the fundamental purpose
behind the Dondi Properties standards.
Once again, this problem could be minimized if a
"clearly unthinkable" standard were applied to sanctions
under Dondi Properties.'76 If only egregious conduct is
sanctionable, then attorneys will be less likely to fire off
unnecessary sanction motions, especially if judges sternly
warn them that frivolous sanction motions will not be tol-
erated. This hands-off approach, however, may leave
hardball attorneys free to disrupt the court system. But if
judges also warn attorneys who are playing hardball that
they will be slapped with sanctions if they continue to
abuse judicial resources, hardball lawyers may become
much more cooperative, especially if judges are willing to
impose stiff penalties on attorneys whose conduct does
rise to a level which violates the "clearly unthinkable"
standard. If Dondi Properties is used sparingly, but force-
fully, judges may be able to curb hardball conduct without
defeating the Dondi Properties court's goal of improving the
efficiency of the federal court system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hardball tactics pose a significant problem to our sys-
tem of justice, wasting valuable judicial and attorney time
and resources. Clearly, some judicial response is neces-
sary, especially considering the inconsistent treatment
among the circuit courts of sanctioning powers under
Rule 11 and section 1927.' 77
Judicial interpretations of Rule 11 and section 1927
175 See Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 288 ("We do not, by adopting these stan-
dards, invite satellite litigation of the kind we now see in the context of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 motions. To do so would defeat the fundamental premise which moti-
vates our actions.").
17,; See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pro-
posed standard.
- See supra notes 49-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of a court's
sanctioning powers under Rule 11; see supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text
for a discussion of a court's sanctioning powers under section 1927.
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have rendered these provisions ineffective to curb many
types of hardball conduct. Accordingly, this comment has
addressed conduct that is generally legal, ethical, and be-
yond the reach of traditional sanctions. 7 8 Nevertheless,
such conduct is making life unnecessarily difficult for any-
one associated with litigation in federal court.
Dondi Properties is a landmark case attempting to estab-
lish standards of conduct for attorneys in order to curb
abusive hardball tactics. These standards, enacted under
the court's inherent powers, focus on the dignity and in-
tegrity that should be expected of a member of the legal
profession. The standards encourage lawyers to be both
cooperative and courteous to each other, to clients, and to
judges.
This comment has examined a number of possible
roadblocks to the imposition of sanctions under Dondi
Properties, noting particularly the possible chilling effect on
legitimate advocacy and the problem of excessive satellite
litigation. However, the Dondi Properties standards,
although rather nebulous, should more than adequately
serve their purpose in most sitations. If the presence of
the standards does nothing more than cause lawyers to
stop and think before engaging in questionable conduct,
they will have achieved an important goal. Perhaps law-
yers will attempt to cooperate with one another before
racing to the courthouse to settle their often petty
differences.
It is too early to tell whether Dondi Properties will achieve
its goal of effectively and efficiently curbing hardball con-
duct. But if Dondi Properties achieves this goal in the
Northern District of Texas, other courts may soon follow
suit, ushering in a new era of sanctions against abusive
litigators. Lawyers who attempt to play hardball in federal
court may discover that, all too often, they strike out.
'I' See Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 148, at 739 ("We are interested
more in conduct that is legal, ethical, and usually beyond the reach of sanctions,
but is nevertheless, in our view, improper.").
If nothing else, Dondi Properties sends out a strong signal
to the litigating bar:
The standard tells us what we already should know in con-
ducting our professional lives. They should instruct the
inexperienced lawyer. They should prick the conscience
of those experienced lawyers who either have lost or never
had respect for their profession. The publication of these
standards is the first punch in the long fight against the
decline in professionalism. Other courts, both state and
federal, should follow suit and join the fight. The courts
and the bar will wrestle with the problem for a long time
to come. At least the fight has begun.' 79
171, Albright, supra note 13, at 19.
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